







Daisetsu T. Suzuki (1870・1966)is considered in this paper as an example of how Buddhist 
philosophy can be expressed in Western terms 
A) According to Jaspers， philosophy began with 
the question "What is ? ，"but Dogen says "to study 
Buddhism is to study oneself， " and by searching for 
s巴lf.one reaches the real world. Intuition which 
grasps the true self is called 戸raf目。，丘ndthis refers to 
a subject which can s巴eitself without objectifying. 
Prajna knows al things as they are and as they 
happen. Suzuki calls the true self "pure subjectivity" : 
Zen takes up this '1' as the subject of its study 
What is '1' ? Th呂tis， who is the self that is 
engaged in talking (or questioning)? How does 
the tal王町 come to know "me" when 1 am the 
talker himself? How can 1 make myself "him"? If 
1 succeed， 1 am no more '1' but "he，" and "he" 
cannot be expected to know "me." As long as '1' 
am the talker，円1"am talking about me not as 
myself but as som巴bodywho stands beside or 
opposite me. The self is an everreceding one， one 
who is forev日rgoing away from the "self." The 
self can never be the self-in-itself when the self is 
made the obj芭ctof the talk. • • • To be more exact， 
p巴rhaps，th己selfcannot be understood when it is 
objectified， when it is set up on the other side of 
experience and not on this side. This is what 1 
mean by "pure subjectivity.川
What concerns Zen is the problem of the self 
which plays with "six lions" or looks out through 
the "six windows" . . . thesubjectum， or what 1 
call pure subjectivity. This is what interests Zen 
and Zen wants us to get acquaint巴dwith it. But 
the Zen way of acquaintance is unique， for it does 
not proceed with the dichotomy of Man-Nature 
or subject-object.' 
Pure subjectivity is pure objectivity in Suzuki's 
words 
When we come to this stage of thinking， pure 
subjectivity is pur日 objectivity，the en-soi is the 
ρour-soi there is perfect identity of Man and 
Nature， of God and Nature， of the one and th巴
many. But the identity does not imply the an-
nihilation of one at the cost of the other. The 
mountains do not vanish; they stand before me. 1 
have not absorbed them， nor have they wiped me 
out of the scene. The dichotomy is there， which is 
suchness， and this suchness (tathata) in al its 
suchness is emptiness(sunyata) itself. The 
mountains are mountains and yet not mountains司
1 am 1 and you are you， and yet 1 am you and you 
are I. Nature as a world of manyness is not 
ignored， and Man as a subject facing the many 
r巴mainsconscious of himself.' 
Pure subjectivity implies subject only， and therefore， 
the nonexistence of the object. In this case， subject 
and object are not mutually related， but rather two 
things in opposition to each other， like s巴erand seen. 
Since they are opposed to each other， and one is 
existent， the other is non-existent. "Only the subject 
exists" implies that the object does not exist， but the 
appellation "subject" does presuppose the existence 
of an object. Her巴， we have a contradiction : we hav巴
stated that the object does not exist， and that the 
subject presupposed an object， so in order to account 
for th巴 presupposedobject， the non巴xistentobj巴ct
would have to become existent， making the subject， in
turn， nonexistent. As a result， the idea that only the 
subject exists can be establish巴donly in conjuction 
with the notion that it does not exist at al. Non-
existence of the subject means existence of the object， 
and "pure subjectivity" means nonexistence of the 
object， but the existenc巴ofthe subject implies its own 
nonexistence， thus establishing "pure objectivity." 
The nonexistence of the subject establishes "pure 
subjectivity" and the nonexistence of the object 
establishes 、ureobjectivity." "I am not 1， ther巴fore1 
am 1川 refersto pure subjectivity. The following 
remarks by Suzuki are helpful in understanding肝pure
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subjectivity is pure obj巴ctivity"
Buddhist philosophy is the philosophy of 
収Emptiness，"it is the philosophy of self-identity. 
Self-identity is to distinguished from mer巴ident
ity. In an identity we have two objects for 
identification; in self-identity there is just one 
object or subject， one only， and this one identifies 
itself by going out of itself. Self-identity thus 
involves a movement. And we see that self-
identity is the mind going out of itself in order to 
see itself reflected in itself. Self-identity is the 
logic of pure experience or of "Emptiness." In 
self-identity ther巴 areno contradictions what-
ever， Buddhists call this suchn巴s.
1 once talked with a group of lovers of the arts 
on the Buddhist teaching of "Emptiness" and 
Suchness， trying to show how the teaching is 
related to the arts. The following is part of my 
talk. .目.1 often hear Chinese or Japanese art 
critics declare that Oriental art consists in depict-
ing spirit and not form. For they say that when 
the spirit is understood the form creates its己lf;
the main thing is to get into the spirit of an object 
which the painter chooses for his subject. The 
West， on the other hand， emphasizes form， 
endeavors to reach the spirit by means of 
form 
How does the painter get into th巴spiritof the 
plant，ー .ーThe secret is to becom己theplant itself. 
But how can a human being turn himself into a 
plant? .ー
The discipline consists in studying the plant 
inwardly with his mind thoroughly purified of its 
subjective， self-centered contents. This means to 
keep the mind in unison with the "Emptiness" or 
Suchness， whereby one who stands against the 
object ceases to be the one outside that object but 
transforms himself into the object itself. This 
identification enables the painter to feel the 
pulsation of one and the same life animating both 
him and the object. This is what is meant when it 
is said that the subject is lost in the object， and 
that when the painter begins his work it is not he 
but the object itself that is working and it is then 
that his brush， as well as his aロnand his fingers， 
becom巴 ob巴dientservants to the spirit of the 
objects. The object makes its own picture. The 
spirit sees itself as reflected in itself. This is also 
a case of self-identity_' 
The statement， "the subject is lost in the object" 
m巴ansthat the object exists， but the subject does not ; 
however， italso means that the object becomes the 
subject. But if it becomes the subject， itis no longer 
the object. Thus， tosay the subject is lost in th巴object
means that the object produces the subject. Here， we 
must recall Dogen's saying : "To forget oneself is to 
realize ones巴lfas al things." If an object paints a 
picture of itself， this establishes the fact of the 
subject， because an object cannot paint itself without 
a subject painting itself. The idea that "the object 
makes its own picture" is the obverse of the idea that 
"the spirit sees itself as reflected in itself." Thus we 
understand that we cannot truly know ourselves 
without knowing al things as they are at the same 
time: this is Suchness (tathata)ーWemust try to know 
ours巴lvesbefore we can know al things as they are 
instead of as they appear to us. As Dogen said， one 
cannot learn one's true self without "realizing oneself 
as al things." Thus， Buddhist philosophers could 
reach the real world as it is by liberating themselves 
from subjective and self-centered views. A manifesta-
tion of this can be seen in the syst巴mof "non-identity 
and non-differentiation" of the knower and the 
known， or the thinker and the thought about 
"Subject" and "Object" can be explained in terms of 
vij目anaand 戸rajnaas follows: Unless it is non-
existent， the subject cannot be known as a subject 
without making itself its own object， any more than a 
finger can point to itself. But since the nature of the 
subject is not to be a subject， itcan be wholly 
comprehended as a subject without making itsεlf an 
object. It is only by being "pure objectivity" that 
"pure subjectivity" can exist. Since the essence of the 
subject is non-subj芭ct，it can comprehend itself as 
subject without being-object， and， because it is 
beyond the suject-object bifurcation， itis not vijnana， 
which is the principl巴ofdifferentiation. 
This kind of subject is called戸ア司j向。， which is the 
basic noetic principle through which the whole can be 
synthetically apprehended. As a non-subject itself， 
ρア勾問。 isnegatively opposed to the subject， yet it is 
identical with the subject 
This ρraj向。cannotbe included under any category， 
it is not knowledge， nor is it wisdom， nor mere 
cleverness， nor intelligence of any ord巴L In Suzuki's 
words; 
In trajna-intuition the object of intuition is 
never a concept postulated by an elaborate 
presess of reasoning ; itis never "this" or "that" ; 
it does not want to attach itself to any one 
particular object' 
We cannot objectify戸切向。;working with al things 
in the outside world， itperceives them as they are 
without making objects of them. Vijnana， on the 
other hand， vi巴wsthings in terms of a subject-object 
dichotomy， and vij日anathought observes al things in 
this way. Praj向。 seesthings from its own unique 
viewpoint， objectively， meaning without a subject 
object bifurcation， and therefore w巴 cansay that it 
views things from their interior rath芭rthan from 
their exterior， or in th巴iressential nature， as they are 
The expression for this is "knowing Suchness，" or the 
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Characteristic of Reality， or al things as-they-are. 
The following is a comparison between prajna and 
Vl}nana: 
Prajna and Vijnana - a Comparison 7 
On the prajna side we may 
list the following : 
On the vi・inanaside we may 
have these counterbalancing : 
Sunyata (emptiness) …………・ ...…・一...….......・H ・H ・H ・...・H ・.…..・H ・.….Aworld of beings and non-beings 
Tathata (suchness)……一-…-・・・・・H ・H ・..・……一・…・...・H ・..・H ・...・H ・.…..Aworld of clear-cut definitions 
Prajna-intuition .. …・ ・ー ・…・・…・・…・・・・…・・・・…・・ …・ ・・ ・・・・・・…・・・…・・・ ・・・・・….. . Vijnana -discrimination 
Nirvana.…........・H ・-……………………….............……・…......一一…・.Samsara(birth-and-death) 
Bodhi (enlightenment)…..・H ・..……......・H ・......・H ・...・H ・-……...・H ・..……...Avidya(ignorance) 
Purity..・・…・・・・・…・・・・・ ・・・…・ ........ ・… -・…・・・・…・・・・・・…ー…・・・・・・・・・・・・…・・・…Defilement
The mind (cita)………...・H ・.…..・H ・..……-….....…........・H ・.........…・一一 ...Thes巴nses(vijnana) 
The Dharma (ultimat巴reality) …………H ・H ・.・H ・...……H ・H ・-…....・H ・...・H ・.Sarvadharma(Individual entities) 
Pure experience ..… ・・…・・・… ・・・・・…・・・…・・…・・…・・・・…・…・・…・…・・・…・・・・ ・…・・…..Experiencesof multitudes 
Pure act (akarma)・・..................日・……………………...・H ・...・…-…........・H ・Aworld of causation 
Undi任erentiated. ・…一 …-….............…・・…H ・・…・・・…-…・ ー…・・......….... …・Di妊erentiated
N on-discrimination .・・…・・・ー ・ ・…・・…・ …・・・…υ ・…・-…-一-…・・ ・一-… .... Discrimination 
No-mind， or no-thought.…・…・・・…・ ・・・・…・ ・…... …......…・…・・・…・・ ・・・…-…・ Individualconsciousness 
Et巴rnalnow， or absolute pr巴sent ……........・・…・-…・・・・…・・・・・・・・ー…・・…・・…・…...-Time relations 
Non-duality ....…・・…ー・…・・・…・…・・…・・…...一・・・…・……・・・・・・…・…・・…・・…・・……一 .Duality 
Etc.・…・・・…・・・・…・・…・・・・…・・…・…・・…・・…ー・…・・・…ー・・…・…・・・・・・…・・・・…・…・・…・…...Etc.
A final remark is in order. Suzuki was rarely 
criticized in Japan. In fact， to the best of my 
knowledge， the first unfavorable articles on him were 
published shortly before his death.8 Therefore， 1 
would like to set down my own impressions of his 
thought. 
As 1 mentioned before， non-identity and non-dif-
ferentiation are the main bases of Suzuki's Zen. But 
unfortunately， not being an academic philosopher， he 
has been unable to convince Western philosophers 
due to an insufficiency in logic; indeed， he may not 
even be interested in undertaking this task. He 
teaches the psychology of Zen， or Absolute N othing-
ness， rather than its logic. He brings his own rich 
experience of Zen to his vivid explanations of it， and 
this is veηT valuable because it is a unique approach 
to the philosopy of Absolute Nothingess and Pure 
Subjectivity and Pure Objectivity. Furthermore， he 
never uses analogies to Westen thought to explain 
Zen; on the contrary he emphatically asserts that 
there is no common ground between Eastern and 
Western thought. 
Briefly， 1 think Suzuki's attitude on Christianity is 
prejudicial. There are many fragmentary remarks 
that he has made， and 1 would like to give a few 
examples. 
In October of 1960， Suzuki and other Buddhist 
scholars met with Hendrick Kraemer at the Otani 
University. When Kraemer asked Suzuki what his 
main objections to Christianity were， he gave the 
following answer : 
1 have nothing to object to， 1 just cannot accept 
Christian doctrine. Let Christians have what they 
like . . . let Buddhist have what they like. Let us 
agree to disagree so we go on peacefully. One 
thing 1 cannot accept in Christianity is their 
dualistic view of existence. They make too sharp 
a distinction between divinity and humanity and 
they think God commands， and man obeys. 1 do 
10t like this legalistic idea of God as commander， 
as creator and men as being commanded and 
obeying and therefore when men do not obey 
what they call divine commands men are punish-
ed. 1 most strongly do not like this idea of 
punishment. Judaism and Christianity are both 
legalistic. Christianity did not lik巴 theway of 
Judaistic legalism. Christ came and proclaimed 
the gospel of love. Love is very fine， indeed. 1 am 
in complete agreement with Christ. But Christ 
could not eliminate this legalistic residual of 
Judaistic thought. According to my way of think-
ing， love ought not to be relative， love ought to be 
absolute. If it is real love， love cannot mak巴any
distinction between so called sinners or non-
sinners. Rain falls on the just as well as the 
unjust， or w巴cansay on the unjust as well as the 
just. This words電justice'.1 don't like it either. 
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There is no justice. We cannot judge each other. 
God， Christians say， God judges. We are not 
judges， human beings are not judges. But how 
could men conceiv巴 thatGod is a judge unless 
men judge each other which 1 don't like 
Now another thing about Christ's own teach司
ings. Christ would say if one strikes the right 
cheek， (or left cheek， 1 forget， but that does not 
matter)， turn the other. Here is something not 
quite innocent. Here is something discriminating， 
that 1 don't like. If a Buddhist were struck on the 
right or left cheek he would just accept it and 
wouldn't turn the other cheek. This is real love. 
There is another thing Christ says，電'loveyour 
enemy." Buddhism would say ther巴isno enemy. 
When you say love of an enemy in distinction 
from friends there is a certain thing which 1 
cannot conceive of as absolute love. That is one 
thing. And then when divinity and humanity are 
forced， so strongly distinguished， there is what 
Dr. Tillich would call participation. 1 don't like 
participation. Love is a total thing. Lov巴 can
never be divided into parts. If God loves， that love 
must be whole， totalistic. If man loves God that 
also cannot be particularistic. But that does not 
mean that God aild man are identical. 1 don't like 
th巴wordidentical either. 1 would say that God is 
God and man is man. They are quite distinct. At 
the same time God is man and man is God. This 
is the most important part.9 
This remains his most detailed and poignant state-
ment on Christianity. On numerous occasions， he has 
insisted that: 
ー Buddhismis more intellectual than Christi-
anity and that the whole drift of Buddhist 
thought tends to encourage an intuitive grasp of 
the emptiness of existence instead of being 
embraced in the love of the highest being.'o 
He feels that Christianity is more symbolic than 
Buddhism. To support this theory， he notes such 
examples as "the story of creation， the fal， God's 
sending of Christ to compensate for the ancestral sins， 
his Crucifixion， and Resurrection . . . they are al 
symbolic." 
In this respect Christianity is more symbolic 
than Buddhism. The story of Creation， the Fall 
from the Garden of Eden， God's sending Christ to 
compensate for the ancestral sins， his Cruci-
fixion， and Resurrection 白eyare al symbolic. 
To be more explicit， Creation is the awakening of 
consciousness， orthe 'awakening of a thought' ; 
the Fall is consciousness going astray from the 
original path; God's idea of sending his own son 
among us is the desire of the will to see itself 
through its own offspring， consciousness; 
Crucifixion is transcending the dualism of acting 
and knowing， which comes from the awakening 
of the intellect; and finally Resurrection means 
the will's triumph over the intellect--in other 
words， the will seeing itself in and through 
consciousness. After Resurrection the will is no 
more blind striving， nor is the intellect mere 
observing the dancer dance. In real Buddhist life 
these two are not separated ; seeing and acting， 
they are synthesized in one whole spiritual life， 
and this synthesis is called by Buddhists Enlight-
enment， the dispelling of Ignorance， the loosening 
of the Fetters， the wiping-off of the Defilements， 
etc. Buddhism is thus free from the historical 
symbolism of Christianity; transcending the 
category of time， Buddhism attempts to achieve 
salvation in one act of the will; for returning 
effaces al the traces of time. II 
This kind of reasoning implies that "Buddhism may 
be considered more scientific and rational than 
Christianity， which is heavily laden with al sorts of 
mythological paraphernalia." Contemporary Chris-
tian have attempted to "denude their religion of this 
unnecessary historical appendix，" but they may not 
necessarily succeed， because "in every religion there 
are some elements which may be called irrational.川2
1 must clarify my ideas about logic: 1 feel logic is 
that which gives unity and a仕ameworkto my rela-
tions with al others， both animate and inanimate. 
First of al， 1 would like to explain man. 
Man is a materially finite spirit. He lives in a 
material world and deals with material objects， 
particularly other persons. Man is made real not only 
by the things he makes or uses， but also in his 
relationships with other human beings who com-
municate with him and inspire his confidence and 
love. It is only through communion with other men 
that man can reach his ful potential: it is others who 
help him attain self-awareness. Other persons act like 
mirrors， and it is by their reflections that one dis-
covers himself as a person. In the same way， only 
through loving others can one fulfil his own highest 
potentialities. The more 1 understand another person， 
出emore 1 can love him， and the more 1 love him， the 
better 1 know him. This is true because of the 
ultimate unity of knowing and willing in the free self-
actuation of the spirit. 
Man is unique among al forms of life in that he 
possesses himself in knowledge and disposes himself 
in freedom. Essentially， his spiritual actions are free， 
and it is only when we can freely understand and 
choose our moral values that an action can be called 
moral. In this way we can perfect ourselves both 
spiritually and personally. Thus we can say that 
moral freedom is an essential of moral activity. 
Nevertheless， man's freedom is not unlimited. It is 
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conditioned by pr巴viousconditioning factors， which 
are necessarily co-existent when a free action is 
initiated. The first. most basic factor is tran-
scendence， b巴cause，as a finite spirit， though evεr 
moving towards the infinite， man's activity cannot be 
determined by finite good. He must be capalble of 
freely dεtermining himself in each instance of ac-
tivity， and in doing so， he implicitly affirms his own 
transc己nden己ce. This is called the dynamism of 
man's intellect. Thus， one could say that the more 
man moves away from himself， rising abov巴 this
world towards an Ultimate Reality， the more he 
becomes wh呂the really is and must be. Man can 
become himself only by transcending al finite being 
towards the U1timate Reality 
Man experiences transc巴ndencemore through free 
and personal spirtual activity than through know 
ledge and moral activity (the dynamis， of man's 
intellect.) This activity means freely and explicitly 
turning towards the Ultimate Reality. Acceptance is 
more than simple knowledg邑Itimplies the free 
welcoming and admittance of the Ultimate Reality， or 
a free giving of se!f， and therefore an action on the 
part of the will (man's intellectual dynamism.) The 
Ultimate Reality cannot be understood in terms of 
this world or of man， and as a spirit standing in front 
of this Ultimate Reality， man's horizon can be opened 
up only by accepting this Ultimate Reality. 
The definition as spirit is part of man's personal 
nature. Man is individual， free， open， dependent on 
community and a person in the world. Man is a 
question unto himself， with the ability to transcend 
any horizon. As a person， man must be capable of 
receiving Ultimate Reality's love with faith and 
compreh巴nsionand yearning for it. Thus， from the 
very beginning man was made to be a capacity for 
Ultimate Reality， and this is his chief and determining 
dimension of existence. To impart significance， 
m巴aningand life to my relation with others， both 
animate and inanimat巴， 1 have only my connection 
with Ultimate Reality. How can 1 say thisつ1am 
existentially convinced that my whole being is sus. 
tained in Ultimate Reality 
1 feel that Ultimate Reality is not an object for 
factual study or knowledge， but the pre-existing 
condition that makes knowledge possible at all. He is 
the unrestricted horizon against which 1 frame al 
that 1 know. When 1 think or speak of Ultimate 
Reality， 1 make it into an object due to the limitations 
of human language， but in fact， Ultimate Reality is 
not such an object: It is the precondition. That makes 
possible the existence of any object 
Therefore， 1 feel that logic is that which gives unity， 
solidarity and structure to my whole relation with al 
other things， both animate and inanimate 
As stated above， 1 am convinced that there must be 
conformity between logic and my whole being. In this 
sense， 1 reject any logic that is not related to my 
whol巴 being.However， Suzuki's thought does not 
provide any point of conn巴ctionwith my exist巴nc日.
For， before 1 with my existence， mind and spirit can 
enter into his thought， his thought seems to jumping 
over my existence， 1巴avingme behind. For me， his 
logic and his thought lack responsibility. Suzuki 
says 
. Zen is not explainable by mere intellectual 
analysis. As long as th巴 intellectis concerned 
with words and ideas， itcan never reach Zen.13 
This is Suzuki's thought but 1 do not accept it. It 
seems to me that for example， World War I was a 
result of Japanese ignoring logic. As Hugo Enomiya-
Lassalle diagnoses it : 
Often it is said that it is difficult， ifnot 
impossible， for a European to understand the 
mentality of the Japanese. One reason is that th巴
origins of ]apanese culture are quite different 
from those of European culture. In a nutshell， it
can be expressed this way. European culture is 
based on thought; ]apanese culture is based on 
non-thought， that is on intuition and feeling. The 
J apanese do not lik巴tothink dialectically， and in 
theoretical discussions they easily pass over 
logical contradictions. . . . The predominance of 
feeling over reason also h巴lpsto explain some of 
th巴 mistakesof Japanese foreign policy. The 
Second W orld War is a classical exampl巴.The 
J apanese experts knew and admitted that they 
did not have a chance against the technically 
superior enemy.14 
B) Y oshinori Takeuchi states : 
Whenev芭rdiscussion arises concerning the 
problem of encounter between being and non. 
being， W日sternphilosophers and th巴ologians，
with hardly an exception， will be found to align 
themselves on the side of being. This is no 
wonder. The idea of電being'is the Archimedean 
point of Western thought. N ot only philosophy 
and theology but the whole tradition of Western 
civilization have turned around this pivot 
AIl is different in Eastern thought and Bud-
dhism. The central notion from which Oriental 
r巴ligiousintuition and belief as well as philosoph-
ical thought have been developed is the idea of 
"nothingness." To avoid serious confusion， how. 
ever， itmust be noted that East and West under 
stand non-being or nothingness in entir巴lydif 
ferent ways.15 
A synthesis of Eastern and Western philosophies 
d巴mandscareful observation of differences as w巴1as 
similarities， ev巴nwhere systems resemble each other 
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One of the greatest contemporary Z巴nphilosophers in 
]apan， Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945)， suggested that 
Western philosophy is based on the concept of Being， 
while Oriental philosophy concerns itself with the 
idea of N othing.16 In th巴samesense， we can say that 
Western mysticism is involved with the concεpt of 
Being and Zen works with the idea of Nothing， 
through both systems use the same method， intuition， 
to achieve their goal 
Zen philosophy denies al the assumptions of Being， 
preferring to state its total concept of reality as 
nothing， while in Western mysticism， the mystic 
directs his efforts at achieving unity with God. In 
doing this， howeveにh巴eitherbecomes a god himself， 
or an enlight巴nedor enlarged Se!f， but either way， he 
is stil involved in the concept of Being. A Zen 
Buddhist， on the other hand， strives to reach that 
stage of existence where巴verything，even the self， is
perceived as nothing. P'u-Yuan (died A. D. 830) 
expressed this idea well when he said， 
If you really comprehend the indubitable Tao， 
it is like a wide expanse of emptiness， so how can 
distinctions between right and wrong be forced 
into it戸7
Tao-Shen said that unity with wu (non-being) is a 
prerequisite to Buddhahood.'8 Zen cannot assimilate 
faith in God as ultimate reality， because it then must 
ask， 電電Whereis God?" and further， "Where is God 
prior to the creation of the world?" 
Prajna will ask : "Even prior to the creation of 
the world， where is God?" Or， more personally: 
"When you are dead and cremated and the ashes 
scattered to the winds， where is yourself 
these questions prajn仰ade印mandsa "quiにckピ"answe釘r 
O肝rr陀es叩ponse巳， and will not allow a mome印n此1此t'sdelay 
for ref臼lectionor rationcination.'凹9 
Furtherrnore， Zen demands an immediate answer， in
fact the first thing that comes to mind， for example， 
your black teacup， or your sister's notebook. Since 
the answer could be truly anything at al， itis 
practically the same as nothing， which is Zen's basic 
assumption. 
Zen Buddhists say of their own sect that it teaches 
nothing， but this should not be taken literally 
Zen has nothing to teach us in the way of 
intellectual analysis; nor has it any set doctrines 
which are imposed on its followers for ac-
ceptance. In this respect Zen is quite chaotic if 
you choose to say so. Probably Zen followers 
may have sets of doctines， but they have them on 
their own account， and for their own benefit; they 
do not owe the fact to Zen. Therefore， there are in 
Zen no sacr巴dbooks or dogmatic tenets， nor are 
there any symbolic formula巴 throughwhich an 
access might bεgained into the signification of 
Zen. If I am asked， then， what Zen teaches， I 
would answer， Zen teaches nothing. Whatever 
teachings there are in Zen they come out of 
one's own mind. W巴teachourselves; Zen merely 
points the way. Unl己ssthis pointing is teaching， 
there is certainly nothing in Zen purposely set up 
as its cardinal doctrines or as its fundamental 
philosophy.20 
It is a fact that Zen constructs no philosophical 
systems and rejεcts any conceptualizing， because it 
recognizes that conceptual description is impossible 
to apply to the nature of reality. Therefore Zen has 
tumed to poetry and art， as Suzuki notes in the 
following statement: "Zen naturally finds its readiest 
expression in poetry rather than in philosophy 
because it has more affinity with feeling than with 
intellect; its poetic pr巴dilectionis inevitable.'山Itis 
perhaps to this idea that Rudolph Otto is referring 
when he says that Zen is anything but a philosophy in 
the Western sense of the word.22 This. how巴ver
should not be taken to mean that it is an artistic 
method totally dependent on immediacy without 
m巴dium.The paradox lies in the fact that， ittakes 
intellect to refute an intellectual method. Therefore， 
we can restate the Zen declaration by saying that it 
teaches that it teaches nothing， inthe same way that 
Socrates， in refuting the Sophists' thesis， modestly 
and ironically declared "I know that I know nothing." 
This positive feature in Zen philosophy is frequently 
glossed over by its critics， but as a matter of fact， 
Zen's genius lies in the logic of the illogical. Zen is not 
a-logical but trans-logical， transcending the dicho-
tomy of subject and object， mind and matter， being 
and non-being， al of which can be classed as rela-
tional knowledge. Zen's total attitude cuts through 
relational knowledge to attain the absolute view-
point. It strives to perceive the world as an absolute 
whole with the true philosophical spirit. Suzuki states 
this cl巴arly: 
. the reader will now know why Zen stands in 
opposition to logic， formal or informal. It is not 
the object of Zen to look illogical for its own 
sake， but to make people know that logical 
consistency is not final， and that there is a certain 
transcendental statement that cannot be attain巴d
by mere intellectual cleverness. The intellectual 
groove of "yes" andれno"is quite accommodating 
when things run their regular course; but as soon 
as the ultimate question of life comes up， the 
intellect fails to answer it satisfactorily. When 
we say "yesぺweassert， and by asserting we limit 
ourselves. When we say "no"， we deny， and to 
deny is exclusion. Exclusion and limitation， 
which after al are the same thing， murder the 
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soul; for is it not the life of the soul that lives in 
perfect freedom and in perfεct unity ? There is no 
freedom or unity in exclusion or in limitation 
Z巴nis well awar巴ofthis. In accordance with the 
demands of our inner life， therefore， Zen takes us 
to an absolute realm wher巴inthere are no 
antithes邑sof any sort_2' 
Zen begins with actual reality， or samsara (birth.and-
death)， of the world as we know it with its sufferings 
and dualities， but according to Zen， ifwe limit 
ourselves to this world of antith白 is.with its mutual 
conditioning of opposites， we can nev己rreally feel 
complete. To emancipate ourselves， Zen rεcommends 
that we adopt a non.dualistic attitude and we can 
achiev巴thisonly by the method of ρrajna-intuition!4 
Intuition calls for viewing al things as beyond discus-
sion or demonstration， transcending knowledge or 
argument. Thus absolute purity can b己 intuitively
understood only if one can go beyond both purity and 
non-purity. It is only by rising above the duality of 
being and non.being that the absolute viewpoint can 
be achieved. Zen mast巴rsare interested not in a mere 
void， but rather in arriving at a state where al 
distinctions are nullified. Therefore， we can say that 
Zen is not without knowledge: rather it has a 
knowledge that is not knowledge， and for this reason， 
Zen is said to consist of the logic of the illogical. 
While this seems paradoxical， itis necessary for Zen 
to rid itself of al ordinary laws of logic in order to 
attain th巴absoluteviewpoint. 
Zen disregards the logicallaw of contradiction， and 
thus reveals its paradoxical natur己.It does not try to 
refute the law of contradiction， but simply ignores it 
in oreder to illustrate the law of identity. Zen states 
the logical proposition: "A is not A; therefore， A is 
A." Zen feels that the actual import of the statement 
"A is A: can be comprehended only when "A is not 
A." Suzuki says: 
We generally reason: "A" is "A" because "A" is 
nA"; or "A'1 is !'A"， therefore， (A1 is HA"， Zen 
agrees or accepts this way of reasoning， but Zen 
has its own way which is ordinarily not at al 
acceptable. Zen would say: "A" is "A" because 
((A" is not HA"; or HA" is not HA"; therefore， HA" 
is HA". 
Our thinking on the worldly level is: Every-
thing has its cause; nothing is without its cause; 
the causation works on and in al things. But Zen 
will agree with some Christians when declare 
that God created the world out of nothing， or that 
God willed and the world came into existence， or 
that代tosay that God created the world yesterday 
or tomorrow would be foolishness， for God 
created the world and everything in it in the one 
present Now." 
Mathematics has this: 0=0， 1ニ1，1+1ェ2，and 
so on. Zen has these too， but it has no objection to 
the following either: 0 = 1， 0 = 2， 1十1=3，etc 
Why? Because zero is infinity and infinity is 
zero. Is this not irrational and beyond our 
comprehension? 
A geometrical circle has a circumference and 
just one centre， and no more or les. But Zen 
admits the existence of a circle that has no 
circumferenc巴norcentre and， therefore， has an 
infinite number of centres. As this circle radius 
from such a centre is of equal length一一一thatis， 
al are equally infinitely long. According to the 
Zen point of view， the universe is a circle without 
a circumferenc巴， and every one of us is the centre 
of the universe. To put it more concretely: 1 am 
the centre， 1 am the universe， 1 am the creator. 1 
raise the hand and lo! there is space， there is 
time， there is causation. Ev巴rylogical law and 
every metaphysical principle rushes in to confirm 
the reality of my hand.25 
Th巴reis another aspect of the thinking-method of 
erasing al distinction which is expressed by the Zen 
doctrine of continuum. In this case， the character of 
the thought-procεss is revealed by a certain type of 
logic， which could be called "Zen dialectic." 
According to Zen teaching， there are no individual 
entities in reality， but rather al are melted into one 
infinite continuum， and th己reforeit is the nature of 
things to be interchangeable. For example， as we 
have seen， "A" i包sthe same as "B，" 
Human language， however， is an expression of 
rational and conceptual comprehension， and cannot 
express anything except by distinction and dif-
ferentiation. Thus， when we use language to express 
some truth which is inherently connected to the 
continuum， we must use a certain type of logic whose 
viewpoint is similar to dialectical logic 
From the absolute viewpoint of Zen， "A" equals 
"B" and everything else too. However， inrational and 
conceptual understanding. "B" is not "A." or as Zen 
would put it， "Bニnon-A".Thus， in the view of the 
continum， A = B can be expressed through conceptual 
thinking as A=non-A. This is similar to the logic of 
the Prajnaparamita Sutras， which exerted a great 
influence on Zen. The Diamond Sutra， for example， 
states: "・ー although innumerable beings have thus 
been led to Nirvana， no being at al has been led to 
入T"'""，.，，，."26 lV!rVaη。
In the continuum， no distinction is made between 
one who has attained Nirvana and one who has not， 
and therefore no one should be pointed out as having 
attained Nirv問。
This type of logic occurs frequently in Zen; here is 
a slightly more complex example: 
Riko (Li K'u)， a high government officer of the 
T'ang dynasty， asked Nansen (Nan-chuan) : "A 
long time ago a man kept a goose in a bottle. It 
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grew larger and larger until it could not get out 
of the bottle any more ; he did not want to break 
the bottle， nor did he wish to hurt the goose ; how 
would you get it out?" The master called out， 
"Oh officer !"一一一towhich Riko at once respond-
ed， "Yes!" "There， itis out !"27 
1n the continuum， the goose inside the bottle is 
identical to the same goose outside it， and therefore， 
the goose inside the bottle is the goose not-inside the 
bottle. The emphasis， however， here is that th日
student of Zen does not gain this insight through 
reason but through intuition. Neither would he 
attempt to explain his insight through reason， thus his 
response， "Oh， officer !" This is a typical example of 
Zen dialectic. 
Occasionally， the relationship between the subject 
"A" and the predicate "A" is nominal， with the two 
remaining distinct until the conclusion， when the 
subject "A" is once more identified with itself. This 
can occur while this simultan巴ousperception of two 
different dimensions--the world as seen from the 
continuum and as understood by conceptual reason-
ing--loses its simultaneity and the two dimensions 
are s巴nsedas distinct from each other. It is in this 
situation that Zen teaches that there is real Seeing 
only when Seeing is not-Seeing. If Seeing means to see 
being as specific， then it is not real Seeing. It is only 
when Seeing is not-Seeing， when it is not a particular 
act of Seeing state of円being"with definite limits， that 
it can be called the true Seeing. There are maロy
similar examples in the Diamond Sutra ; 
And why? Because from it has issued the 
utmost， right and perfect enlightenment of the 
Tathagatas， Arhats， Fully Enlight巴nedOnes， and 
from it have issued the Buddhas， the Lords. And 
why? For the Tathagata has taught that the 
dharmas special to the Buddhas are just not a 
Buddha's special dharmas. That is why they are 
called 'the dharmas sp巴cialto the Buddhas'. 28 
Naturally， the question arises as to whether we 
should compare Zen dialectic with Hegel's dialectic 
1n both cases， the steps of the dialectic take place at 
different levels. Hegel's logic， however， isdynamic， 
and moves forward as his thought mov巴sfrom one 
level to another. Zen， on the other hand， does not 
move， but rather thinks imultaneously in two dim巴n-
sions. This is because， absolutely speaking， there is 
only one plane in Zen where the worlds of the 
absolute and r巴lativecan be conjoined， and therefore， 
there can be no forward movement. 
We have seen that there is no absolute contradic-
tion in Zen logic， ifeach of its logical "moments" is 
divided into two dimensions. Contradictions only 
seem apparent because the logic of two dimensions 
must be expressed through the instrumentality of the 
logic of one dimension， inlanguag巴orconceptual and 
discursive thinking. Consequently， Zen logic displays 
its Gwn consistency， and we can say that it is not "a-
logical" but rather. "trans-logical." 
While Zen dialectic was influenced by thεMad-
hyamika school， itmust not be forgotten that in 
borrowing and ad旦ptingthis logic to th巴irown needs， 
the Chinese did not adopt the Indian habit of specula-
tion. Madhyamika often uses speculation to rufut巴
intellection， but Zen do巴snot indulge in this approach 
at al， preferring to use imagery and meaningful 
gestures for communication. Masters frequently 
relate their experiences and thoughts through the 
images of poetry and art. 1n truth， itis possible that 
we communicate more through acts and gestures in 
our daily lives than through language. For example， 
when we visit someone， we knock on the door to 
communicate the fact that we have arrived， and 
someone come to invite us in. We also respond to the 
feelings of oth巴rsas communicated by their eyes and 
facial expressions; as we see， movies are ful of 
meaningfull scenes without dialog. Indeed， silence is 
sometimes more eloquent than words. Zen has 
realized the value of this type of communication and 
uses it to express its teachings 
As we have seen， the way of thinking in Zen can be 
paradoxical and confusing. Suzuki calls this method 
刊Soku-hi."Soku means non-diff巴rence，or non-diver-
sity (identity)， and hi means non-uniformity (dif-
ference). Suzuki maintains that Zen expresses this 
paradox through the logic of the soku-hi in the 
Diamond Sutra，29 which says: "Because al beings are 
not al beings， therefore they are called al beings. "30 
Because there is no Buddha， there is Buddha; because 
there are no sestient beings， th巴reare sentient 
beings.31 
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